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Abstract
Human agents happen to judge that a conjunction of two terms is more probable
than one of the terms, in contradiction with the rules of classical probabilities—this is
the conjunction fallacy. One of the most discussed accounts of this fallacy is currently
the quantum-like explanation, which relies on models exploiting the mathematics of
quantum mechanics. The aim of this paper is to investigate the empirical adequacy
of major quantum-like models which represent beliefs with quantum states. We first
argue that they can be tested in three different ways, in a question order effect con-
figuration which is different from the traditional conjunction fallacy experiment. We
then carry out our proposed experiment, with varied methodologies from experimental
economics. The experimental results we get are at odds with the predictions of the
quantum-like models. This strongly suggests that this quantum-like account of the
conjunction fallacy fails. Future possible research paths are discussed.
1 Introduction
Conjunction fallacy was first empirically documented by Tversky and Kahneman (1982,
1983) through a now renowned experiment in which subjects are presented with a descrip-
tion of someone called “Linda”:
“Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in phi-
losophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination
and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.”
Then, subjects are shown a list of 8 possible outcomes describing her present employment
and activities, and are asked to rank the propositions by representativeness or probability.
Two items were specifically tested:
(1) “Linda is a bank teller”,
(2) “Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement”.
Empirical results show that most people judge (2) more probable than (1). In the
framework of classical probabilities, this is a fallacy—the conjunction fallacy—, since a
conjunction cannot be more probable than one of its components. If Linda being active
in the feminist movement is denoted by F and Linda being a bank teller by B, then
p(F ∩B) 6 p(B) should classically prevail.
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The conjunction fallacy has been shown to be particularly robust under various varia-
tions of the initial experimental protocol (cf. Tversky and Kahneman 1982, 1983, Gigeren-
zer 1996, Kahneman and Tversky 1996, Hertwig 1997, Hertwig and Chase 1998, Hertwig
and Gigerenzer 1999, Mellers et al. 2001, Stolartz-fantino et al. 2003, Bonini et al. 2004,
Tentori et al. 2004, Hertwig et al. 2008, Moro 2009, Kahneman 2011, Erceg and Galic
2014; for a review, cf. Moro 2009). It has been observed in other cases than the Linda
story, about topics like sports, politics, or natural events, and in scenarios in which the
propositions to be ranked are not preceded with a description. The fallacy also persists
when the experimental setting is changed, e.g. in “between subjects” experiments in which
(1) and (2) are presented to different subjects only. Semantic and syntactic aspects have
also been discussed, in relation with possible misunderstandings, like the implicit mean-
ing of the words “probability” and “and”. Careful experiments show that the conjunction
fallacy persists.
The conjunction fallacy questions the fact that classical probability theory can be used
to describe human judgment and decision making, and it can also be viewed as a challenge
to the definition of what a rational judgment is. Thus, it is no surprise that the conjunction
fallacy has been the subject of a big amount of research (Tentori and Crupi 2012 give the
number of a hundred papers devoted to it). It has interested psychologists, economists and
philosophers alike. For instance, behavioral economists have looked at the consequences
of the fallacy for understanding real life economic behavior, measuring the robustness of
this bias in an economic context with incentives or in betting situations (e.g. Charness et
al. 2010, Nilsson and Anderson 2010, Erceg and Galic 2014). They have also investigated
whether the cognitive abilities of subjects are related to behavioral biases in general (and
to the conjunction fallacy in particular, cf. Oechssler et al. 2009), and this has led to
stimulating research with applications in finance. Epistemologists have made confirmation
and Bayesianism enter the debate (e.g. Tentori and Crupi 2008 and 2012, Hartmann and
Meijs 2012, Schupbach 2012, Shogenji 2012).
Given that a conjunction fallacy occurs under robust experimental conditions, a natu-
ral question arises: how can this fallacy be explained? Several accounts have been argued
for, but no one has reached an uncontroversial status today (as noted by Fisk 2004, Nilsson
et al 2009, Jarvstad and Hahn 2011, Tentori et al. 2013). First, Tversky and Kahneman
originally suggested that a representativeness heuristic (i.e. the probability that Linda is
a feminist is evaluated from the degree with which the instance of Linda corresponds to
the general category of feminists) could account for some conjunction fallacy cases. But it
has been argued that the representativeness concept involved is informal and ill-specified
(Gigerenzer 1996, Birnbaum et al 1990), and suggestions to specify it in the technical sense
of a likelihood value (Shafir et al 1990, Massaro 1994) account for limited cases only (Crupi
et al. 2008). According to another suggestion, agents actually evaluate the probability of
the conjunction from some combination of the probabilities of the components, like aver-
aging or adding (Fantino et al. 1997, Nilsson et al. 2009). However, such explanations
do not resist empirical tests, as Tentori et al. (2013) have argued. The latter propose
an account of the conjunction fallacy based on the notion of inductive confirmation as
defined in Bayesian theory, and give experimental grounds for it—it is one of the currently
promising accounts. Others have argued, also within a Bayesian framework, that there
are cases in which the conjunction fallacy is actually not a fallacy and can be accounted
for rationally (Hintikka 2004, von Sydow 2011, Hartmann and Meijs 2012). Finally, an-
other prominent proposal to account for the conjunction fallacy, on which we focus here,
makes uses of so-called “quantum-like” models, which rely on the mathematics of a major
contemporary physical theory, quantum mechanics (Franco 2009, Busemeyer et al. 2011,
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Yukalov and Sornette 2011, Pothos and Busemeyer 2013)—note that only mathematical
tools of quantum mechanics are exploited, and that the models are not justified by an
application of quantum physics to the brain.
The quantum-like account of the conjunction fallacy is particularly promising as it
belongs to a more general theoretical framework of quantum-like modeling in cognition and
decision making, which has been applied to many fallacies or human behavior considered
as irrational (for reviews, see Pothos and Busemeyer 2013, Ashtiani and Azgomi 2015, or
Bruza et al. 2015; textbooks include Busemeyer and Bruza 2012, Haven and Khrennikov
2013). For instance, quantum-like models of judgments have been proposed to account
for order effect, i. e. when the answers given to two questions depend on the order of
presentation of these questions (Atmanspacher and Ro¨mer 2012, Busemeyer and Bruza
2012, Wang and Busemeyer 2013, Wang et al. 2014); for the violation of the sure thing
principle, which states that if an agent prefers choosing action A to B under a specific
state of the world and also prefers choosing A to B in the complementary state, then she
should choose A over B regardless of the state of the world (Busemeyer et al. 2006a,
Busemeyer et al. 2006b, Busemeyer and Wang 2007, Khrennikov and Haven 2009; for
Ellsberg’s paradox more specifically, cf. Aerts et al. 2011, Aerts and Sozzo 2013, Aerts
et al. 2014; for Allais’ paradox, cf. Khrennikov and Haven 2009, Yukalov and Sornette
2010, Aerts et al. 2011); for asymmetry judgments in similarity, i.e. that “A is like B” is
not equivalent to “B is like A” (Pothos and Busemeyer 2011); for paradoxical strategies in
game theory such as in the prisoner’s dilemma (Piotrowski and Sladowski 2003, Landsburg
2004, Pothos and Busemeyer 2009, Brandenburger 2010). More generally, new theoretical
frameworks with quantum-like models have been offered in decision theory and bounded
rationality (Danilov and Lambert-Mogiliansky 2008 and 2010, Lambert-Mogiliansky et al.
2009, Yukalov and Sornette 2011).
As the quantum-like account of the conjunction fallacy is one of the few promising
accounts of the conjunction fallacy that are discussed today, we choose to focus on it in
this paper. More specifically, we focus on the class of quantum-like models which are
presented or defended in Franco (2009), Busemeyer et al. (2011), Busemeyer and Bruza
(2012), Pothos and Busemeyer (2013) and Busemeyer et al. (2015).1 In these models, an
agent’s belief is represented by a quantum state — and not for instance by a measurement
context. Our aim is to assess the empirical adequacy of these quantum-like models that are
used to account for the conjunction fallacy. We think that two points deserve particular
scrutiny. First, it is not always clear which version of the models are supposed to account
for particular cases of conjunction fallacies—are the simplest ones, called non-degenerate,
sufficient? or are the more general ones, called degenerate, needed? More recent works
tend to favor degenerate models over non-degenerate ones, and non-degenerate models have
received some recent criticisms (cf. Tentori and Crupi 2013 and Pothos and Busemeyer
2013, p. 315-316), but a clear and definitive argument on the matter would be welcome.
Second, the models have not yet been much tested on other predictions than the ones they
were intended to account for. It should be checked that they are not ad hoc by testing
their empirical adequacy in general. It is understandable that these two points have not
been tested beforehand, as a new general pattern of explanation for the conjunction fallacy
is hard to come up with. But since the models have come to be seen as one of the most
promising accounts, it becomes urgent to assess them empirically more thoroughly—this
is our goal in this paper.
1There exist other quantum-like models or theories that claim to account for the conjunction fallacy,
like Yukalov and Sornette (2010, 2011).
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As for the first point—discriminate between non-degenerate and degenerate models—,
we follow a suggestion made by Boyer-Kassem et al. (2016) to test so-called “GR equa-
tions”, that are empirical predictions made by non-degenerate models2. Such a GR test
requires a new kind of experiment: not the original Linda experiment, in which agents
have to rank propositions, but an order effect experiment, in which two yes-no questions
are asked in one order or in the other, to different agents. Existing data cannot answer
the question of whether the GR equations are verified, as was already noted in 2009 by
Franco:
“There are no experimental data on order effects in conjunction fallacy experi-
ments, when the judgments are performed in different orders. Such an experi-
ment could be helpful to better understand the possible judgment strategies.”
(Franco 2009, 421)
We fill this gap here by running several order effect experiments that collect the needed
data.
As for the second point—test new empirical predictions of the models—, we consider
two tests that apply to any version of the quantum-like models, whether degenerate or not,
that are used in the account of the conjunction fallacy. It is well-known in the literature
that quantum-like models that account for the conjunction fallacy predict an order effect
for the two questions associated with the conjunction (“Is Linda a bank teller?” and “Is
Linda a feminist?”). Actually, this predicted order effect is not a side effect of the quantum-
like models, but a core feature of them: they cannot account for the conjunction fallacy
without it. This enables a direct test of the quantum-like account of the conjunction
fallacy, that we apply to our collected experimental data. Also, it has been shown that
any quantum-like model of the kind involved in the account of the conjunction fallacy
must make an empirical prediction called the “QQ equality” (Wang and Busemeyer 2013,
Wang et al. 2014). We thus test whether the QQ equality is verified. The failure of any
of these last two tests will be enough to refute the current quantum-like account of the
conjunction fallacy. Here also, the needed data is not available in the literature, but can
be conveniently obtained from the same above-mentioned new experimental configuration,
with two yes-no questions in both order. Note that our methodology is novel: we are
not testing the quantum-like models against data produced by traditional conjunction
fallacy experiments that the model were designed to explain, but we are testing them
against other data, in a new experimental framework on which the models actually make
some predictions, and it is why the experimental situation we shall consider is different
from the usual Linda experiment. Our experiment instantiates the mechanism that the
quantum-like account claims agents follow: to evaluate a conjunction like “feminist and
bank teller”, agents are supposed to evaluate one characteristic after another, answering
for themselves to two yes-no questions (“is Linda a feminist?”, “is Linda a bank teller?”).
In other words, the experiment we run somehow forces agents to follow the purported
quantum-like mechanism.
To have more powerful tests, we have conducted several experiments, with variations
of the scenario (Linda, but also others known as Bill, Mr. F. and K.), of the protocol
(questionnaires or computer-assisted experiment) and with or without monetary incentives.
The results we obtain show that current quantum-like models are not able to account for
the conjunction fallacy.
The outline of the paper is the following. In Section 2, a general quantum-like model
is introduced. Section 3 presents the three empirical tests that will be performed: the
2In Boyer-Kassem et al. (2016), the test is made for quantum-like order effect models.
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GR equations, order effect, and the QQ equality. The experimental protocol is presented
in Section 4, and the results in Section 5. Section 6 presents the statistical analysis, and
Section 7 discusses the scope of the results and the future of the research on the conjunction
fallacy account.
2 A quantum-like account of the conjunction fallacy
As indicated in the introduction, we focus in this paper on a family of quantum-like
models based on similar hypotheses that have recently been proposed to account for the
conjunction fallacy. They are presented or defended in Franco (2009), Busemeyer et al.
(2011), Busemeyer and Bruza (2012), Pothos and Busemeyer (2013) and Busemeyer et al.
(2015).3 For simplicity, we choose here to summarize them with a single model with our
own notations, and the correspondence with the various models from the literature can
easily be made by the reader. For illustrative purposes, we shall consider the conjunction
fallacy through the Linda case, but the generalization to other instances of the conjunction
fallacy are straightforward.
According to this literature, after reading Linda’s description, the subject who has to
choose the more likely proposition between
(1) “Linda is a bank teller”,
(2) “Linda is a feminist and a bank teller”.4
has the following mental process. To compare the propositions, she evaluates each one in
terms of a yes-no question:
(Q1) “Is Linda a bank teller?”,
(Q2) “Is Linda a feminist and a bank teller?”.
An important hypothesis of the quantum-like models is that, when the subject considers
(Q2), she actually answers for herself successively two simple yes-no questions:
(QF ) “Is Linda a feminist?”,
(QB) “Is Linda a bank teller?”.
Answering “yes” to Q2 amounts to answering “yes” to both QF and QB. Also, the hy-
pothesis is made that the more probable outcome (bank teller or feminist) is evaluated
first. As the description of Linda makes her more likely a feminist than a bank teller, this
means that Q2 is answered by answering first QF and then QB.
5 Let us now turn to the
quantum-like framework that enable the quantitative prediction of the conjunction fallacy,
p(2) > p(1).
2.1 Quantum-like models
For pedagogical purposes, the non-degenerate versions of the quantum-like models are
presented first, and the degenerate versions afterwards. The belief states of agents are
represented within a vector space. In the simple case where an agent have just given
an answer “yes” (respectively “no”) to question QF , her belief state is represented by the
3There exist other quantum-like models or theories that claim to account for the conjunction fallacy,
like Yukalov and Sornette (2010, 2011). However, the latter theory does not display some features that are
central to our present tests (like the reciprocity law), which casts doubt on the possibility to test it in the
same way.
4The original sentence used in Tversky and Kahneman (1983) is now abridged in this form, as robustness
studies have shown that the existence of the fallacy does not depend on such details.
5Franco (2009) does not explicitly make this hypothesis, but he implicitly considers that the conjunction
(2) will be evaluated by answering QF and then QB (p. 418). Anyway, the tests we consider in the
forthcoming sections do not depend on this hypothesis.
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vector Fy (respectively, Fn). In accordance with the literature, we shall say for short that
these vectors represent the answers themselves. Similarly with By and Bn for answers to
question QB. The sets (By, Bn) and (Fy, Fn) respectively represent all possible answers
to questions QB and QF , and thus each one is a basis of the same 2-dimension vector
space.
The vector space is equipped with a scalar product, thus becoming a Hilbert space: for
two vectors W and X, the scalar product W ·X is a complex number. The order of the
vectors within a scalar product here matters: X ·W is the complex conjugate of W ·X.
The above bases are supposed to be orthogonal: By ·Bn = Fy · Fn = 0, and of unitary
norm: By ·By = Bn ·Bn = Fy · Fy = Fn · Fn = 1. A representation of the bases in the
special case of real coefficients can be found on Figure 1 [Left].
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Figure 1: [Left:] The two bases corresponding to the answers “yes” and “no” to questions
QB and QF . [Right:] The state vector Ψ can be decomposed on the two orthonormal
bases (the scalar products on By and Bn are indicated). These figures assume the special
case of a Hilbert space on real numbers.
An agent’s state of belief is represented by a normalized vector Ψ within the Hilbert
space. This vector can be decomposed in either of the two above-mentioned bases, as
indicated on Figure 1 [Right]:
Ψ = (By ·Ψ)By + (Bn ·Ψ)Bn = (Fy ·Ψ)Fy + (Fn ·Ψ)Fn. (1)
With the specific values taken in Figure 1 [Right] in a Hilbert space on real numbers, this
equation becomes for instance:
Ψ = 0.8By + 0.6Bn ≈ 0.949Fy + 0.316Fn. (2)
The belief state Ψ gathers all the relevant information needed to predict the behavior
of the agent, in the following way. Predictions made by the quantum-like models are
probabilistic. When a question QX (X = B or F ) is asked, the probability that the agent
answers Xi (i = y or n) is given by the squared modulus of the scalar product between
the belief state and the vector representing the answer:
p(Xi) = |Xi ·Ψ|2. (3)
This rule is usually called the Born rule, in analogy with the quantum mechanics denom-
ination. It enables to compute the probability that the agent gives each of the 4 answers,
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in case questions QB or QF are asked (as Ψ is normalized, p(Xy)+p(Xn) = 1). In the case
of a real Hilbert space like on Figure 1, a geometric interpretation of the Born rule is the
following: to compute the probability to answer, say, “yes” to question QB, orthogonally
project Ψ on By — this gives the length By ·Ψ, and the wanted probability is just the
squared of it. So, the more Ψ is aligned with a basis vector Xi, the larger the probability
is that the agent will answer i if question QX is posed (note the “if question QX is posed”
part: in quantum-like models, the probability of an answer is only defined in the context
in which the corresponding question is posed). For instance, with the specific values in
Figure 1 [Right], p(By) = 0.64, p(Bn) = 0.36, p(Fy) = 0.9 and p(Fn) = 0.1, which is
consistent with the relative alignments of the basis vectors with Ψ.
The last postulate of the quantum-like model has to do with the way Ψ changes over
time. First, Ψ does not change unless the agent answers a question. This conveys the fact
that the agent’s beliefs are not externally influenced. This hypothesis is supposed to be
relevant for cases in which the questions are posed to the agent relatively quickly. Second,
when the agent answers a question QB or QF , her state of belief changes. If her answer
to question QX is Xi, then her new state of belief just after giving the answer is:
Ψ 7−→ Xi ·Ψ|Xi ·Ψ|Xi. (4)
As the fraction in Eq. 4 is a complex number, the state of belief after an answer Xi is
proportional to the vector Xi representing this answer. In the case of a real Hilbert space
like on Figure 1, after answering “yes” to question QB, Ψ becomes either By or −By,
whatever the state of belief before the question. In other words, after a question X has
been posed, the state of belief is bound to be along the basis vectors representing its
answers. Eq. 4 can be interpreted as follows: the (Xi ·Ψ)Xi part represents the fact that
Ψ is projected on Xi, the basis vector representing the given answer; the 1/|Xi ·Ψ| part
is then just a multiplicative factor that ensures that the new state of belief is normalized.
Hence, the above rule is often called the projection postulate.
Because of the projection postulate, the states before and after an answer are in general
different. They are the same only if the state previous to the answer is proportional to
one of the basis vectors representing the possible answers to the question, i. e. when
Ψ = λXi, where λ is a complex number such that |λ| = 1 (in the real case, Ψ = ±Xi).
In such a case, the agent answers i to question X with probability 1, and Eq. 4 states that
Ψ 7−→ Xi. The fact that the state of belief changes when a question is answered is a
real departure from the classical viewpoint. Classically, the answer is supposed to reveal
a belief, which is pre-existent to the question, and is the same before and after. However,
the quantum-like models predict that once a question has been answered, the same answer
will be given if the same question is posed again just after.
Let us now turn to the more general versions of these models, the degenerate ones. The
difference lies in the fact that an answer is not represented by a vector belonging to a 1D
space, but by any subspace of dimension m, for instance a plane. Then, the Hilbert space
is not of dimension 2, but of a higher one. When question QX is posed, the probability
that the agent answers Xi is now defined as:
p(Xi) = |PXi ·Ψ|2. (5)
where PXi is the orthogonal projector onto the subspace representing answer i to question
QX . The change in the state of belief is now:
Ψ 7−→ PXi ·Ψ|PXi ·Ψ|
. (6)
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Figure 2: A quantum-like account of the conjunction fallacy in Linda’s scenario. This
figure assumes the special case of a Hilbert space on real numbers.
For the rest, the model is the same.
2.2 Accounting for the fallacy
The mental process that gives rise to the conjunction fallacy that has been described
at the beginning of this Section is graphically illustrated on Figure 2. The probability of
considering that Linda is a bank teller corresponds to the squared length of the projection
of Ψ onto the bank teller vector By, and p(B) = |α|2. For instance, with the specific
values used in Figure 2 with a real Hilbert space, α ≈ 0.316 and p(B) = 0.1. On the other
hand, the probability of considering her to be feminist and bank teller corresponds to the
squared length of the projection of Ψ onto two successive vectors, first Fy and then By,
and p(F ∩B) = |β|2. In the example of Figure 2, β = 0.6 and p(F ∩B) = 0.36.
So, there exist some model configurations, like the one plotted on Figure 2, in which
the probability to be judged feminist and bank teller is higher than the probability to be
judged bank teller, leading to
p(F ∩B) > p(B), (7)
in accordance with empirical results. A quantum-like model of the conjunction fallacy has
been provided.6
3 Empirical tests
This section presents the three empirical predictions of the above quantum-like model
that we will test. The first one applies to non-degenerate models, while the others apply
to non-degenerate and degenerate models.
6We have slightly simplified the account given by Busemeyer et al. (2011). When an agent evaluates
the conjunction, they do suppose that answering for herself the first question QF projects her state vector
onto either Fy or Fn, but they do not suppose that answering for herself the second question QB projects
the state vector onto By or Bn, because they argue that what is needed at this time is only an evaluation
of the probability, and not a firm answer (the authors acknowledge the validity of the projection postulate
as soon as the agent gives a definite answer to a question). So, the authors actually do not specify what
the state vector is after the evaluation of the conjunction (personal communication, 2014). For simplicity,
we have made as if the state vector was projected onto either By or Bn, like for other questions, but this
has no consequence for our forthcoming tests. See also Section 4.
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3.1 The GR equations
Following Boyer-Kassem et al. (2016), some specific empirical predictions can be de-
rived for non-degenerate models, i.e. in which the answers are represented by subspaces
of dimension 1. It can be shown that a well-known law from quantum mechanics, the law
of reciprocity, holds. Consider the two questions QF and QB in one order or in the other.
The law of reciprocity states that, for (X,Y ) ∈ {B,F}2, and (i, j) ∈ {y, n}2,
p(Yj |Xi) = p(Xi|Yj). (8)
This law asserts that conditional probabilities of an answer given another answer are the
same whatever the order of the questions QB and QF . Note that this law is typically
quantum: it is not true in general for a classical model, in which p(Yj |Xi) = p(Xi|Yj) ×
p(Yj)/p(Xi), and thus p(Yj |Xi) 6= p(Xi|Yj) as soon as p(Yj) 6= p(Xi).
The law of reciprocity can be instantiated in the following ways:

p(By|Fy) = p(Fy|By), (9)
p(Bn|Fy) = p(Fy|Bn), (10)
p(By|Fn) = p(Fn|By), (11)
p(Bn|Fn) = p(Fn|Bn). (12)
Some easy computation enable to show that the following equations, called the Grand
Reciprocity (GR) equations, hold (cf. Boyer-Kassem et al. 2016, Section 3.1):
{
p(By|Fy) = p(Fy|By) = p(Bn|Fn) = p(Fn|Bn), (13)
p(Bn|Fy) = p(Fy|Bn) = p(By|Fn) = p(Fn|By). (14)
These equations 13 and 14 are equivalent to one another and to the law of reciprocity
itself.7 They state that the conditional probabilities that exist when QB is asked before
QF is asked — call it situation (QB, QF ) — and in the (QF , QB) situation are actually
much constrained: among the eight quantities that can be experimentally measured, there
is just one free real parameter. In other words, the non-degenerate quantum-like model
presented in Section 2.1 actually leaves very little freedom to conditional probabilities.
The fact that the conditional probabilities are constrained by the GR equations had not
been noticed beforehand for quantum-like models for the conjunction fallacy. Note that
these empirical predictions are consequences of the quantum-like models that are used to
explain the conjunction fallacy in the Linda experiment, and that these consequences are
observable in experimental situations — (QB, QF ) and (QF , QB) situations — that are
not the ones of the original Linda experiment. In other words, the GR equations show
that a non-degenerate quantum-like model that is used to explain a Linda experiment can
be further tested on another kind of experiment. We shall come back on this point in
Section 4.
The interpretation of the conditional probabilities is clear: they have been defined as
the probability of some answer to a second question given the answer to a first question.
This is straightforwardly consistent with the models presented in Section 2, and in accor-
dance with classical order effect experiments. Another interpretation of the conditional
probabilities could be that of an answer given some new piece of evidence, but this is not
what is considered in this paper.
7Boyer-Kassem (2016, Section 3) show that the GR equations are equivalent to double stochasticity in
both orders (cf. also Khrennikov 2010, p. 24 and 36), and presents generalizations of the GR equations.
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3.2 Order effect
Quantum-like models of Section 2.1 can predict an order effect, that is, predict that
agents give different answers to the question QF followed by question QB, and to the
question QB followed by question QF (cf. Figure 3). This comes from the projection
postulate that modifies the state of belief when an answer is given to a question. This
order effect property of the quantum-like models is well-known, and it has actually been
used to provide a quantum-like account of order effect (see for example Conte et al. 2009,
Busemeyer et al. 2009, Busemeyer et al. 2011, Atmanspacher and Ro¨mer 2012, Pothos
and Busemeyer 2013, Wang and Busemeyer 2013 and Wang et al. 2014, Boyer-Kassem et
al. 2016) — thus, the same models are at the basis of the account of order effect and of
the conjunction fallacy.
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Figure 3: The state vector Ψ, projected first onBy and then on Fy, or first on Fy and then
on By, gives different lengths. Consequently, the corresponding probabilities of answering
“yes” to questions QB and QF depend on the order of presentation of the questions: it is
an order effect.
More importantly, it can be shown that only models that display an order effect are able
to account for the conjunction fallacy (cf. Busemeyer et al. 2011, Busemeyer and Bruza
2012, Bruza et al. 2015 p. 388, Busemeyer et al. 2015). In other words, the quantum-like
models of Section 2 that do not present an order effect cannot predict p(F ∩ B) > p(B),
and thus cannot account for the conjunction fallacy. The reason is, in short, the following:
questions QB and QF are either compatible or incompatible in the standard quantum
sense. In the latter case, the Hilbert space is (in the simplest case) 2D, with basis vectors
like on Figure 1, and there is an order effect. In the former case, the Hilbert space is
(in the simplest case) 4D, with basis vectors (BFyy, BFyn, BFny, BFnn), where the
vector BFij stands for answer i to question QB and answer j to question QF , in whatever
order. And such a model displays no order effect: whatever the order of the questions,
the probability of an answer i to question QB and of an answer j to question QF will be
|Ψij |2, where Ψij is the coordinate along the BFij vector (Ψij = BFij · Ψ). Can such
a model predict a conjunction fallacy to occur? On the one side, consider the evaluation
of the conjunction: the agent first considers QF ; if she answers “yes”, the state vector is
projected onto the plane (BFyy,BFny). If she now answers “yes” to QB, the resulting
vector is projected onto BFyy. So, the probability to answer “yes” to both questions is
given by the square modulus of the BFyy component, i.e. |Ψyy|2. On the other side,
consider the evaluation of B, for which the agent considers QB. If she answers “yes”, the
state vector is projected onto the plane (BFyy,BFyn). The probability of such an answer
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is given by the squared modulus of the length of this projection, namely |Ψyy|2 + |Ψyn|2
(remember that the basis vectors are orthogonal). This quantity is at least larger than
|Ψyy|2, so a conjunction fallacy cannot occur.
To sum up, any quantum-like model of the kind considered in Section 2 which claims to
account for the conjunction fallacy, be it non-degenerate or degenerate, has to display an
order effect on the corresponding questions. This provides our second test (cf. Section 6
for a discussion of the mathematical expression of the test). The proponents themselves
of the quantum-like account of the conjunction fallacy consider that the use of incompat-
ible concepts (or questions) is the key feature of their model. As incompatible questions
straightforwardly imply an order effect, our order effect test is actually a direct test of the
core feature of the quantum-like account.8 As for the GR equations, note that the order
effect is here understood as an experimental situation with two successive yes-no questions,
posed in one order or in the other after a text has been read, and that no new piece of
evidence is provided between the two questions. To sum up, three features are essential
for the quantum-like models under study to account for the conjunction fallacy: the Born
rule (eq. 3), the projection postulate (eq. 4), and the presence of incompatible questions
entailing order effects.
3.3 The QQ equality
The quantum-like models of Section 2, whether degenerate or not, have recently been
shown to entail new testable empirical predictions (Wang and Busemeyer 2013): a “Quan-
tum Question” (QQ) equality. Noting p(Xi, Yj) the probability of answering first i to
question QX and then j to question QY (this is a joint probability, not a conditional
probability), the QQ equality reads:
p(Fy, Bn) + p(Fn, By) = p(By, Fn) + p(Bn, Fy). (15)
This equality is of prime importance. As Busemeyer et al. (2015, 241) put it, “it is
an a priori, precise, quantitative, and parameter-free prediction about the pattern of order
effects”. It has served as a test of the quantum-like models that claim to account for order
effect. It turns out that “it has been statistically supported across a wide range of 70
national field experiments (containing 651 to 3,006 nationally representative participants
per field experiment) that examined question-order effects (Wang et al., 2014)” (ibid.).
Similarly, the QQ equality can be empirically tested in the case of the quantum-like models
that account for the conjunction fallacy, as the models are the same. This constitutes our
third test (further statistical details about the test are given in Section 6).
4 Experimental design
The three tests presented in the previous section (GR equations, order effect, QQ
equality) require to carry out an order effect experiment that shows the description of
Linda and then asks the questions QF and QB in both orders, (QF , QB) or (QB, QF ).
The former order somehow forces the agent to follow the cognitive process supposed by the
quantum-like models when evaluating a conjunction. We propose here its first experimental
realization, in order to test the quantum-like models of Section 2.
The order effect experiment we are considering here is different from the original con-
junction fallacy experiment. If we want to claim that it tests anyway the quantum-like
8One could consider to test whether the questions QF and QB are compatible or incompatible. But the
easiest way to do so is actually to test the order effect on these two questions.
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account of the conjunction fallacy, do we need to make some extra hypothesis? For in-
stance, do we need to suppose that the quantum-like model for the conjunction fallacy also
applies to another kind of experiment? Or do we need to assume that forcing an agent to
explicitly answer the two questions will give the same results as when she answers them for
herself? We need not, because these assumptions are already made in the papers we are
considering. First, the simple fact that the quantum-like account of the conjunction fallacy
relies on “models” that have a general and universal form9 and not only on ad hoc rules
that apply to a limited number of situations, allows anyone to use these models ad libitum
in any experimental situation that the model may represent. The order effect situation,
in which two questions are asked, clearly falls within that range. So, we are allowed to
apply (and thus to test) the quantum-like models of the conjunction fallacy in an order
effect experiment. This amounts to testing experimental predictions of the models that
they make because they have a general form. As the proponents of the models write:
“The basic quantum model underpinning the conjunction fallacy [...] makes new a priori
predictions. Foremost among them is the consequence that incompatible judgments and
decisions must entail order effects.” (Bruza et al. 2015, p. 388). (Recall that incompatible
judgments are required in the quantum-like model of the conjunction fallacy.) In other
words, the conjunction fallacy model entails order effects, and thus can be tested on them.
This is all the more true than the authors actually claim that the quantum-like models
used for the conjunction fallacy are the same as those used to explain other fallacies or
phenomena, like order effect itself or similarity judgments. All models belong to a family
that are often called a “theory” of quantum cognition, and they are meant to make predic-
tions on a wide range of phenomena, in diverse experimental situations — and the authors
rightly claim that this is a strength of their approach. This supports the generality of the
quantum-like models used for the conjunction fallacy. Thus, it is legitimate to use them
in other situations like the order effect one. Besides, these models have been applied to
question order effect (Wang and Busemeyer 2013, Wang et al. 2014), and it is clear that
no extra hypothesis than the ones presented in Section 2 is needed for that. In sum, the
literature claims that the very same models can be used for the conjunction fallacy and
for question order effect, so we are justified in testing them on new order effect cases as
Linda’s.
Finally, recall that we consider here two successive yes-no questions, asked in both
orders. Thus, the conditional probabilities are interpreted as probabilities of a second
answer given a first answer. This is fully in line with the models of the conjunction fallacy
themselves. Consider for instance: “In this problem there are two questions: the feminism
question and the bank teller question. For each question, there are two answers: yes or
no.” (Busemeyer and Bruza 2012, p. 15); “we consider two dichotomous questions A and
B, as for example A: Is Linda a feminist? and B: Is Linda a bank teller?” (Franco 2009
p. 416 ). What we propose here is to explicitly pose these two questions.
4.1 Four conjunction fallacy-like tasks
In order to strengthen our experimental tests, we have considered four scenarios that
have been shown in the literature to give rise to conjunction fallacies, from which we have
built four experimental tasks — a task consists for an agent in reading a text and then
sequentially answering two yes-no questions.
The first task is drawn from the case of Linda (Tversky and Kahneman 1983):10
9E.g. “In general, a person’s state of beliefs about the presence or absence of various feature combinations
is represented by...” (Busemeyer et al 2015, p. 237).
10Please refer to Appendix B for the French version that was actually used in the experiments.
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– Text: “Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination
and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.”
– QF : “According to you,
11 is Linda a feminist?”
– QB: “According to you, is Linda a bank teller?”
The second task is drawn from the case of Bill (Tversky and Kahneman 1983):
– Text: “Bill is 34 years old. He is intelligent, but unimaginative, compulsive, and
generally lifeless. In school, he was strong in mathematics but weak in social studies
and humanities.”
– QA : “According to you, is Bill an accountant?”
– QJ : “According to you, does Bill play jazz for a hobby?”
The third task is drawn from the case of Mr. F. (Tversky and Kahneman 1983):
– Text: “A health survey was conducted in a representative sample of adult males in
France of all ages and occupations. Mr. F. was included in the sample. He was
selected by chance from the list of participants.”
– QH : “According to you, has Mr. F. already had one or more heart attacks?”
– QM : “According to you, is Mr. F. over 55 years old?”
The fourth task is drawn from the case of K., a Russian woman (Tentori et al. 2013):
– Text: “K. is a Russian woman”.
– QN : “According to you, does K. live in New-York?”
– QI : “According to you, is K. an interpreter?”
So as to increase the robustness of our results, we have chosen these four tasks as they
display different kinds of conjunction fallacies, in the sense of Tversky and Kahneman
(1983) who have distinguished between M–A and A–B paradigms. In the former, a model
M (the text describing the person) is positively associated with an event A (one of the
two sentences forming the conjunction) and negatively with the other event B. This is the
case of the Linda scenario: the introductory text M is positively associated with the event
“Linda is a feminist” and negatively with the other one “Linda is a bank teller”. Also,
Bill’s scenario is of type M–A. Differently, in the A–B paradigm, A is positively associated
with B, but not with the model M. For instance, “Mr. F. is over 55 years old” is positively
associated with “Mr. F. already had one or more heart attacks”, but not with the text.
The scenario of the Russian woman seems to correspond to neither paradigm: the positive
association occurs between the text M and the conjunction of the two constituents A and
B, and not with only one of them, so we might call it M–(AB) — the fact that the woman
is Russian is strongly associated with the fact that she lives in New York and is also an
interpreter.
4.2 Experimental protocol
Conjunction fallacies and quantum-like models have been studied by scholars of various
fields, and in particular by psychologists and economists (cf. Section 1). To keep with these
two traditions, we have chosen not to limit ourselves to one experimental protocol — which
also has the advantage of increasing the robustness of the experimental findings. We have
varied the administration method, with paper questionnaires like in the psychological
tradition and with computer implementations like in the economical tradition, with and
without payment.
11We have added the terms “According to you” at the beginning of each question so that the agents do
not begin wondering on the possible existence of a correct answer. Furthermore, these terms convey the
spirit of the initial instructions of Tversky and Kahneman (1983) to evaluate a characteristic according to
its probability, which supposes here a subjective part of judgment.
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Table 1: Experimental tasks that were carried out, together with their administration
methods, the location, and the number of subjects involved. Two dashed horizontal lines
separate into three groups the seven experimental tasks, corresponding to three distinct
experiments.
Exp. Task ID Scenario Administration Location No. of subjects
1 T pMr. F. Mr. F. Paper, not paid Nice, Tours 496
T pBill Bill Paper, not paid Nice, Tours 496
2 T c,eK. K. Computer, paid Montpellier 302
T c,eMr. F. Mr. F. Computer, paid Montpellier 302
T c,eBill Bill Computer, paid Montpellier 302
T c,eLinda Linda Computer, paid Montpellier 302
3 T cLinda Linda Computer, not paid Nice 354
We have carried out three experiments (cf. Table 1 for a summary). In the first exper-
iment, two tasks were successively presented to the subjects: that of Mr. F. and that of
Bill. The experiment was conducted in March and April 2015 at the University of Tours
and of Nice Sophia Antipolis (France), with a total of 496 students in medicine, economics
and management. In the psychological tradition, the tasks were implemented with paper
questionnaires, in the lecture hall at the end of classes. Because of the improvised recruit-
ment without appointment, and because of the short length of the task, the students were
not paid, like in the psychological tradition. These tasks are noted T pMr. F. and T
p
Bill, with
an index “p” for “paper”.
The second experiment successively featured the 4 tasks introduced above in the follow-
ing order: K. the Russian woman, Mr. F., Bill and Linda. The experiment was conducted
on April 2015 at the LAMETA, the experimental economics Laboratory of the University
of Montpellier 1 (France), in 19 sessions, with a total of 302 students possibly from any
discipline. In the economics tradition, the tasks were implemented on computers (created
with the z-Tree program, Fischbacher 2007), and students were recruited online and re-
ceived a show-up fee (5 or 9 euros, according to their campus of origin) to remunerate their
attendance and to reduce the effect of selection bias. These tasks are noted T c,eK. , T
c,e
Mr. F.,
T c,eBill and T
c,e
Linda, with an index “c” for “computer” and a euro for the payment.
A third experiment involved the task of Linda, in a mixed methodology. It was con-
ducted on October 2014 in the LEEN, the experimental economics laboratory of the Uni-
versity Nice Sophia Antipolis, with a computerized questionnaire. 354 students were re-
cruited on the fly at the end of the classes, and were not paid for the short task. This task
is noted T cLinda, with an index “c”.
Each task comes in two treatments, according to the ordering of the questions QX and
QY . According to a between-subject approach which is consistent with the literature on
question order effect, each subject only receives one treatment of a task: either QX then
QY , noted (QX , QY ), or QY then QX , noted (QY , QX). We took all necessary precautions
to organize the sessions in such a way as to avoid discussions among students having and
having not performed the experiment, and we ensured that the students had never heard
of the Linda story nor studied order effect or conjunction fallacy.
All experimental sessions were run in compliance with the ethical rules of the LEEN
and of the LAMETA. These rules are known by subjects when they enrol on the web-
based recruitment platform. Even in the experimental sessions run at the end of classes
in the lecture hall, confidentiality and anonymity of data collection were guaranteed. Stu-
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dents participated on a voluntarily basis and they were informed about the nature of the
experimentation.
An objection to our protocol has to be considered. In our first two experiments, several
tasks are successively presented to a same subject. Is not there a risk that a former task
influences the answers provided to the following task(s)? Two considerations enable to
answer negatively. Firstly, from an experimental perspective, Stolartz-Fantino et al. (2003)
proposed six conjunction fallacy tasks in sequence and observed no significant difference in
conjunction error rate over the tasks. So, there seems to be no learning effect or influence
between tasks. Secondly, the quantum-like models themselves imply theoretically that
the tasks do not have any influence on one another. This is so because the stories, and
in particular the mental representations that the subjects form of them, are sufficiently
distant from each other, in a technical quantum-mechanical sense: the basis vectors of the
different tasks (Linda is feminist, Bill plays jazz for a hobby, ...) are compatible in the
quantum mathematical framework, which implies that no order effect can occur among
the different tasks (see e.g. Wang and Busemeyer 2013). It might be empirically the case
that our tasks do influence one another, but no matter: as here we only intend to test
these quantum-like models, and not to establish experimental results that could be used
outside of these models, we are justified in relying on them for our protocol. Quantum-like
models justify our experimental protocol that tests them, and that is sufficient.
5 Experimental outcomes
This section presents the experimental outcomes for each task. As a reminder, with
QX and QY denoting the two questions of a task, (QX , QY ) denotes the treatment where
QX is posed first and QY is posed second, and (QY , QX) the treatment in the reverse
order. Two response categorical variables X and Y are introduced. X ∈ {Xy, Xn} is the
Bernoulli random variable represented by question X assuming two possible values Xy for
“yes”and Xn for“no”. Similarly, Y ∈ {Yy, Yn} is the Bernoulli random variable represented
by question Y assuming values Yy for “yes” and Yn for “no”. Both treatments (QX , QY )
and (QY , QX) are thus statistical experiments described by multinomial distributions. For
each task and treatment, there are four possible outcomes, for instance for the (QX , QY )
treatment: {(Xy, Yy), (Xn, Yy), (Xy, Yn), (Xn, Yn)}. The joint [relative] frequency of people
responding i to the first question QX and then j to the second question QY is noted
n[f ](Xi, Yj). Table 2 reports the joint [relative] frequencies for each treatment, for our
seven tasks.
6 Statistical analysis and test of research hypotheses
To analyze the above experimental results, we proceed in two steps. The first step is
technical: we perform the three statistical tests presented in Section 3 (Sections 6.1 to
6.3). In the second step, we take a more general viewpoint and we interpret the results of
the tests in relation with several major research hypotheses (Section 6.4).
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Table 2: Cross tabulations of the joint [relative] frequencies n[f ](Xi, Yj) for the two treat-
ment of the seven tasks. The four possible outcomes of the (QX , QY ) treatment are
reported in the upper part of the table, while the four possible outcomes of the (QY , QX)
treatment are reported in the bottom part.
Task T pMr. F. T
p
Bill T
c,e
K. T
c,e
Mr. F. T
c,e
Bill T
c,e
Linda T
c
Linda
(QX , QY ) (QM , QH) (QA, QJ) (QN , QI) (QM , QH) (QA, QJ) (QB, QF ) (QB, QF )
n[f ](Xy, Yy) 56 [0.21] 22 [0.10] 14 [0.09] 17 [0.12] 9 [0.06] 1 [0.01] 7 [0.04]
n[f ](Xy, Yn) 10 [0.04] 100 [0.46] 12 [0.08] 7 [0.05] 83 [0.55] 1 [0.01] 6 [0.04]
n[f ](Xn, Yy) 72 [0.28] 31 [0.14] 18 [0.12] 34 [0.23] 9 [0.06] 104 [0.67] 86 [0.51]
n[f ](Xn, Yn) 123 [0.47] 65 [0.30] 111 [0.72] 89 [0.61] 49 [0.33] 49 [0.32] 68 [0.41]
total 261 218 155 147 150 155 167
(QY , QX)
n[f ](Yy, Xy) 27 [0.11] 26 [0.09] 10 [0.07] 15 [0.10] 20 [0.13] 4 [0.03] 5 [0.03]
n[f ](Yn, Xy) 19 [0.08] 163 [0.59] 8 [0.05] 15 [0.10] 80 [0.53] 2 [0.01] 8 [0.04]
n[f ](Yy, Xn) 52 [0.22] 28 [0.10] 24 [0.16] 34 [0.22] 12 [0.08] 79 [0.54] 57 [0.30]
n[f ](Yn, Xn) 137 [0.58] 61 [0.22] 105 [0.71] 91 [0.59] 40 [0.26] 62 [0.42] 117 [0.63]
total 235 278 147 155 152 147 187
6.1 Test of the GR equations
The GR equation (13, or equivalently 14, see Section 3.1) consists in the equality of 4
conditional probabilities. Thus, it is equivalent to 6 two-by-two equalities to be tested:
T1: f(Xy|Yy) = f(Yy|Xy), (16)
T2: f(Xy|Yy) = f(Xn|Yn), (17)
T3: f(Xy|Yy) = f(Yn|Xn), (18)
T4: f(Yy|Xy) = f(Xn|Yn), (19)
T5: f(Yy|Xy) = f(Yn|Xn), (20)
T6: f(Xn|Yn) = f(Yn|Xn). (21)
It is worth noting that the rejection of only one test is sufficient to state that a GR
equation is not verified on a task. We test all the equivalences with 6 statistical tests
adopting conditional relative frequencies with the null hypothesis that the two conditional
relative frequencies are equal (please refer to appendix A for a detailed description of the
statistical test, taken from Boyer-Kassem et al. 2016). Our two-tailed test imply that the
null hypothesis of equality between the two conditional frequencies at the K% significance
level is rejected if:
p-value = 2 ·
(
1− CDFstdNorm
(∣∣∣∣ log(OR)SElogOR
∣∣∣∣)) ≤ K100 . (22)
CDFstdNorm is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution
(mean = 0 and standard deviation = 1). log(OR) and SElogOR are respectively the log
odds ratio and its standard error. The multiple comparisons (the 6 simultaneous tests) and
the joint testing of 7 tasks require performing a correction of the type I error, if we want
to control for the probability of making at least one false discoveries in the whole table.
We apply the Bonferroni correction, which is the most conservative one as it makes false
positives much less liable to occur. We apply it doubly, on the 6 tests and on the 7 tasks.
The risk is obviously to restrict our statistical inference to only one case by increasing the
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Table 3: Adjusted p-values for each task and test. The value is in bold when the null is
rejected at the 5% significance level. With the double Bonferroni corrections, the proba-
bility of having at least one false positive in the entire table is guaranteed to be less than
5%.
Task ID T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 #R at 5%
T pMr. F. 0.00 0.07 21.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 4
T pBill 0.00 0.00 2.57 0.84 0.14 0.00 3
T c,eK. 2.61 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.11 4
T c,eMr. F. 0.08 34.67 3.02 0.00 0.00 0.66 2
T c,eBill 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.92 0.16 0.00 4
T c,eLinda 0.92 21.93 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 3
T cLinda 0.01 21.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5
type II error, that is, the presence of false negatives, but the adoption of this correction
guarantees that the conclusion of rejections that we provide is robust. Accordingly, we
adopt adjusted p-values as follows:
adjusted p-value = 6 · 7 · p-value. (23)
Table 3 reports adjusted p-values for each of the six tests. It shows that for all tasks,
at least two out of the six statistical tests reject the null of equality between the two
conditional relative frequencies. Hence, we can safely say that the GR equations are not
empirically satisfied in our experiments.
6.2 Test of the order effect
Consider now the test of the order effect. The tradition in the literature is to test the
null of absence of order effect (e.g. Wang and Busemeyer 2013 and Wang et al. 2014).
Table 4 reports the adjusted p-values of the log-likelihood ratio test with a Bonferroni
correction for such a test. The null is rejected in two tasks (T pMr. F. and T
c
Linda), which
enables us to assert safely that these two tasks exhibit an order effect. It could be tempting
to infer that five tasks out of seven do not exhibit an order effect. However, it is well-known
that there are possible errors of type II, which in that case are not well controlled. As here
we need to be able to say with a high confidence level whether there is no order effect,
this traditional test is insufficient. For that reason, we propose a more rigorous test, with
the reverse null hypothesis that there exists an order effect.
This reverse null hypothesis requires the adoption of a specific statistical test. We
choose the two one-sided test (TOST) procedure of equivalence testing for binomial random
variables (Barker et al. 2001)12. Equivalence tests are used to assess whether there is a
practical difference in two means of occurrence (binomial proportions). This concept is
formalized by defining a constant δ called the equivalence margin, which defines a range
of values for which the two means are “close enough” to be considered equivalent. This
arbitrary notion of “close enough” is the most distinctive feature of equivalence testing.
Concretely, equivalence testing in our context amounts to considering as the null hy-
pothesis H0 that, in two distinct treatments (QX , QY ) and (QY , QX), the absolute dif-
ference between two probabilities of occurrence of an event e, pXY (e) and pY X(e), is
12Equivalence tests are commonly adopted in medicine to state if novel therapies have equivalent efficacies
to the ones currently in use. For instance they are used by FDA to establish the equivalence between a
generic drug versus an established drug.
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Table 4: Adjusted p-values for each task. The value is in bold when the null of absence
of order effect is rejected at the 5% significance level. With the Bonferroni correction, the
probability of having at least one false positive in the table is guaranteed to be less than
5%.
Task ID absence of OE
T pMr. F. 0.01
T pBill 0.25
T c,eK. 3.60
T c,eMr. F. 2.84
T c,eBill 0.91
T c,eLinda 0.50
T cLinda 0.00
greater than a pre-specified level δ > 0 (formally, H0(e) : |pXY (e) − pY X(e)| > δ). The
order effect is commonly studied with respect to a specific answer to one of the ques-
tions, that is, Xy, Xn, Yy or Yn. For instance, the order effect of the event “answer-
ing yes to question QX” (Xy) is evaluated by estimating the absolute difference of the
marginal probabilities (marginal relative frequencies) of the event Xy in the two treat-
ments (QX , QY ) and (QY , QX), formally, |pXY (Xy) − pY X(Xy)|. According to our no-
tations, pXY (Xy) = p(Yy, Xy) + p(Yn, Xy) and pY X(Xy) = p(Xy, Yy) + p(Xy, Yn). As
p(Xy) = 1 − p(Xn), the order effect of the event Xy is equivalent to the order effect of
the event Xn, for both treatments. In order to state that there is no order effect, or that
the order effect is insignificant in a task, it is necessary and sufficient to test the validity
of the two null hypotheses H0(e1) and H0(e2) at a time for both questions QX and QY
simultaneously. The following set of equations should be verified:
|pXY (Xy)− pY X(Xy)| = |p(Yy, Xy) + p(Yn, Xy)− p(Xy, Yy)− p(Xy, Yn)| > δ, (24)
|pXY (Yy)− pY X(Yy)| = |p(Yy, Xy) + p(Yn, Xy)− p(Xy, Yy)− p(Xy, Yn)| > δ. (25)
Statistically, we adopt the TOST procedure which is based on a confidence interval ap-
proach, that is, it declares the equivalence, at a chosen nominal value of significance α,
if a (1 − 2α)100% equal-tailed confidence interval is completely contained in the interval
[−δ, δ]. We consider the simple asymptotic interval approach to estimate the confidence
interval
CI : fxy(e)− fyx(e)± Zα ·
√
fxy(e)(1− fxy(e))
nxy(e)
+
fyx(e)(1− fyx(e))
nyx(e)
, (26)
where Zα represents the (1 − 2α)100th percentile of a standard normal distribution and
the notation f(e) stands for the marginal relative frequency which is the estimator of the
marginal probability p(e). If the CI is contained in the interval [−δ, δ], then we reject the
null hypothesis.
Figure 4 shows the results of the test for the seven tasks, with our choice of a nominal
value of significance α = 5% and a threshold δ = 0.1. Before commenting on these results,
let us justify the chosen values of the two parameters α and δ. A large value of δ easily
leads to rejections, while a small value hardly leads to rejections (a value of δ = 0 has
no statistical meaning). In the TOST procedure, the δ value is supposed to be chosen
before the experiment is run, from indications from the literature or from some a priori
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Figure 4: Equivalence testing for the seven tasks and two events Xy and Yy. For each
task, two vertical segments correspond to the estimated confidence interval (CI) for the
events for the “yes” answer to both questions QX and QY . Intervals in bold are entirely
contained within the δ interval [−0.1, 0.1] highlighted with two horizontal lines.
consideration.13 In our case, there is no clear indication coming from the literature that
bears on a similar problem (i.e. we could not find any work addressing the issue of testing
the null of presence of order effect). Yet, a priori consideration can be attempted, as some
theoretical studies provide simulated evidences of the power of the equivalence testing.
Given similar statistical conditions, i.e. a sample size around 200 statistical units, δ = 0.1
and α = 0.05, the simulated power of the equivalence testing attains a probability value of
around 0.75 of rejecting the null when the difference between the two relative frequencies
is less than 0.05 (Barker et al. 2001, p. 282, Table 3). In other words, our choice of
parameters enables to expect that, if we judge a difference of less or equal 0.05 to be
irrelevant in terms of order effect, then the test is effective in three cases out of four. Some
a posteriori justification of the value of δ can be added. Figure 4 shows a great variability
in CIs between similar tasks, for instance between T pMr. F. and T
c,e
Mr. F., T
p
Bill and T
c,e
Bill , or
T c,eLinda and T
c
Linda, and that variability (measured for instance as the difference of the top
margin of both CIs) is of the order of 0.1. These pairs of tasks are not fully homogeneous
in terms of administration method, but we think that it is sensible to consider them as
highly informative of an inner variability of the order effect phenomenon, when the size
of the sample is around 200 subjects. Thus, it would not make much sense to choose a δ
lower than that inner variability of 0.1. Our choice of 0.1 is thus the most conservative in
this respect.
To strengthen the test, we also add the condition that the value 0 should be part of
the CI. Two out of the seven tasks (T c,eK. and T
c,e
Mr. F.) fulfill these two conditions: for both
events Xy and Yy, the CIs are entirely contained within the δ interval [−0.1, 0.1], and the
13In medicine, the literature reports that ex ante discussions among practitioners are required to find
an agreement on the δ value to specify what the irrelevant differences are between the efficacies of similar
drugs or medical treatments (see e.g. Walker and Nowacki 2011).
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Table 5: Adjusted p-values for each task. The value is in bold when the null of satisfaction
of the QQ equality is rejected at the 5% significance level. With the Bonferroni correction,
the probability of having at least one false positive in the table is guaranteed to be less
than 5%.
Task ID QQ equality
T pMr. F. 5.402
T pBill 0.324
T c,eK. 4.226
T c,eMr. F. 3.356
T c,eBill 6.200
T c,eLinda 0.167
T cLinda 0.001
value of δ = 0 is included in the estimated CI. Thus, these two tasks exhibit an order effect
that can be deemed as insignificant.
Note that the results of our TOST test are in line with the more traditional test with
the opposite null hypothesis reported above. In particular, the two tasks that do not
exhibit an order effect according to the TOST test (T c,eK. and T
c,e
Mr. F.) are exactly those
which exhibit the highest adjusted p-values (Table 4), with a large margin compared to
the other tasks. This consistency is a clue that our choice of parameters α and δ are
meaningful and not too permissive.
6.3 Test of the QQ equality
To test the QQ equality, we adopt the statistical test proposed in Wang and Busemeyer
(2013) and Wang et al. (2014), based on the log-likelihood ratio test, commonly used
to compare the goodness of fit of two models.14 The two models are an unconstrained
one and a constrained one by the QQ equality. The difference of the two log-likelihoods
follows a χ2 statistic with degrees of freedom resulting from the difference of the degrees of
freedom of each model. As we perform the same test over 7 different tasks, we also adopt
a Bonferroni correction of the type I error, which is the most conservative one. Table 5
reports the adjusted p-values for each task, with the null hypothesis that the QQ equality
is satisfied for all tasks.15 It is clear that for only one task (T cLinda, last row) we can reject
the null, thus stating that the QQ equality is not satisfied. Conversely, for all tasks except
the last one, nothing can be concluded. They are either false negatives or cases where the
QQ equality is satisfied.
14We thank the authors of these two papers for kindly giving us their code to perform the statistical test.
15It is worth noting that, when using the Bonferroni correction, the null hypothesis is here that all
tasks satisfy the QQ equality — this is the so-called general null hypothesis. Even if we apparently reject
only one task according to the adjusted p-values, we are in fact rejecting the corresponding general null
hypothesis that all tasks are of the same nature. Somehow paradoxically, if we knew ex ante that all tasks
would be of different nature and that only some would satisfy the QQ equality, we should not adopt the
Bonferroni correction but consider instead seven individual null hypotheses. The results of these individual
tests without the Bonferroni correction would be that three out of the seven tasks are rejected (the p-
values are easy to estimate from Table 5 by dividing the adjusted p-values by 7). The rejected tasks
correspond to three out of the four MA paradigm tasks, with Linda and Bill. This could be taken to
suggest that there might be a difference between the nature of the tasks: MA tasks would tend to reject
the QQ equality, whereas AB and (AB)M would tend to satisfy it. In any case, we prefer to keep the
conservative Bonferroni correction to make unquestionable rejections, and we invite further research to
study the individual hypothesis more in depth.
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6.4 Interpretation of the results and relation with general research hy-
potheses
On the basis of the above experimental results, we now would like to test three re-
search hypotheses that have motivated the quantum-like modeling literature on conjunc-
tion fallacy, and that correspond to the building blocks of the current models presented in
Section 2. This shall provide some interpretation of the bare statistical results obtained
in Sections 6.1 to 6.3. The first two hypotheses have already been presented in the intro-
duction and concern the validity of quantum-like models, while the third one is larger and
goes beyond quantum-like models:
• Hyp. #1: Non-degenerate quantum-like models (presented in Section 2) can ac-
count for the conjunction fallacy,
• Hyp. #2: Non-degenerate or degenerate quantum-like models (presented in Sec-
tion 2) can account for the conjunction fallacy,
• Hyp. #3: The conjunction fallacy account can rely on a question order effect
account.
The first hypothesis is the simplest and less general one. It restricts accounts of the
conjunction fallacy to the simplest versions of the quantum-like models, i.e. non-degenerate
ones, where answers are represented by 1-D subspaces. This is the hypothesis made in
Franco (2009), who only considers non-degenerate models. This hypothesis implies that the
GR equations are empirically verified. As Section 6.1 has shown that the GR equations are
never verified in our experiments, we can safely say that the first hypothesis is empirically
refuted by our data. In other words, non-degenerate quantum-like models cannot account
for order effects. This refutes the proposal by Franco (2009), who has only considered non-
degenerate models — all other quantum-like models cited in Section 2 are not refuted, since
they also consider degenerate models. The rejection of the first hypothesis echoes recent
debates. The empirical inadequacy of non-degenerate models for the conjunction fallacy
has already been discussed, although the question had not been definitely settled (cf.
Tentori and Crupi 2013 and Pothos and Busemeyer 2013, p. 315-316). In a similar vein, it
has been shown that non-degenerate models for order effect are not empirically adequate
(Boyer-Kassem et al. 2016). Overall, our result is in line with previous suggestions that
degenerate models should be preferred to non-degenerate models, as the latter should be
considered as “toy models” only (e.g. Busemeyer and Bruza 2012, Busemeyer et al. 2015).
The second research hypothesis extends the first one by considering also degenerate
models, that is, models in which an answer is represented by a N -D subspace, e.g a plane.
This hypothesis is shared by all papers cited in the beginning of Section 2, except Franco
(2009): the conjunction fallacy can be accounted for by quantum-like models in general, be
they non-degenerate or degenerate. As argued in Section 3, non-degenerate and degenerate
models have (i) to display an order effect and (ii) to respect the QQ equality. Thus, the
second hypothesis is testable by means of the test of the order effect and that of the
QQ equality. Table 6 summarizes the findings on these matters. Both tests’ results are
reported, the satisfaction of the QQ equality in the second column and the presence of
order effect in the third one. The last column reports the joint outcomes of the two tests,
that is, the outcome of the logical operator “and”, because either one test or the other one
are sufficient to refute the quantum-like models of conjunction fallacy considered in this
paper. Recall that we have adopted a very conservative approach on the error of type I,
so as to be conclusive with a high degree of certainty. So, we can be quite sure that the
second research hypothesis is rejected in at least three out of seven tasks. Our conclusion
here is that the quantum-like models cannot account for the general phenomenon of the
conjunction fallacy. It is the first time that such a strong result is obtained experimentally.
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Table 6: Statistical results for the second research hypothesis. A dash means an absence
of pronouncement.
Task ID QQ OE QQ and OE
T pMr. F. - Yes -
T pBill - - -
T c,eK. - No No
T c,eMr. F. - No No
T c,eBill - - -
T c,eLinda - - -
T cLinda No Yes No
The third hypothesis is not restricted to quantum-like models, but is concerned with
the general idea that the conjunction fallacy is related to a question order effect between
suitable questions (for instance in the Linda scenario between the questions QL and QF ).
It implies that an order effect must be observed in our experiments, and thus this hypoth-
esis is testable by means of the order effect test. Two out of seven tasks exhibit no (or
insignificant) order effect, as shown in Section 6.2. And yet, the corresponding scenarios
(K. and Mr. F.) do exhibit a conjunction fallacy. These results suggest that the third
hypothesis, according to which the conjunction fallacy can be accounted for from an order
effect, seems to be experimentally refuted. Note that the consequences of the rejection
of this hypothesis have an even much broader impact than the ones deriving from the
rejections of previous hypotheses: not only are we rejecting the original modeling strat-
egy exploited by the quantum-like literature based on the introduction of an order effect
to explain the conjunction fallacy, but we are also preventing its adoption for any other
alternative theory (Bayesian, heuristics...). The conjunction fallacy cannot be reduced, in
terms of mental acts, to the order effect phenomenon. This finding sheds some new light
into an important modeling issue.
7 Conclusion
We have considered the quantum-like accounts of the conjunction fallacy that have been
proposed or defended by Franco (2009), Busemeyer et al. (2011), Busemeyer and Bruza
(2012), Pothos and Busemeyer (2013) and Busemeyer et al. (2015) — which common trait
is to represent the belief of the decision-maker with the quantum state. We have tested
three empirical predictions of these models: the GR equations (Boyer-Kassem et al. 2016),
that apply to non-degenerate versions only of the models, the existence of an order effect
and the QQ equality (Wang and Busemeyer 2013), which apply to both non-degenerate
and degenerate versions of the models, hence to the most general version of the papers.
Such tests cannot be performed in traditional conjunction fallacy experiments, in which
subjects have to rank propositions, but require an order effect experiment, in which two
yes-no questions are asked in either order. So, the tests concern empirical predictions
that are not the data that the models were supposed to explain in the first place, but
are predictions of the models anyway, and are directly related to the core feature of the
models, namely the incompatibility between questions. We have performed such order
effect experiments, by using a robust protocol that varies the stories (Linda, Bill, Mr.
F., K.), the administration method (paper questionnaires or computer), and a possible
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payment, with seven tasks in total and several hundreds of subjects.
Our empirical results clearly reject the hypothesis that non-degenerate models can
account for the conjunction fallacy (which is the hypothesis made in Franco 2009). This
confirms the recent tendency from the advocates of the quantum-like approach to consider
non-degenerate models as toy models only. Most importantly, our results also reject the
more general hypothesis that non-degenerate or degenerate models can account for the
conjunction fallacy, which is the hypothesis made in all other papers. As we have used
very conservative statistical tests, we can safely say this general hypothesis is refuted in at
least three tasks out of seven. So the present paper provides the first clear experimental
rejection of the quantum-like explanation of the conjunction fallacy.
Now, it may be possible that not all instances of the conjunction fallacy can be ac-
counted for in a quantum-like fashion, but that some instances can. For instance, our
experimental results have not formally excluded that Bill’s scenario could be amenable
to a quantum-like account. There is room for possible future experimental research here
— a possible line of division to be investigated could be between AB and MA scenarios
of conjunction fallacies. But thus, the quantum-like account would loose its generality,
which was its strength. Moreover, if quantum-like models were to apply to some cases
of conjunction fallacies, it seems very likely that it should be degenerate versions, since
non-degenerate one have been strongly ruled out. This comes with possible drawbacks
or specific duties, as argued in Boyer-Kassem et al. (2016). In particular, a degenerate
model resorts to some extra dimensions in the Hilbert space that should receive theoreti-
cal and experimental justifications so as not to be just ad hoc. And more general tests on
elementary dimensions can also be considered.
As our experimental results speak against the quantum-like models of the conjunction
fallacy, they can be interpreted as indirect support in favor of alternative accounts of
the conjunction fallacy, like Bayesian ones (e.g. Tentori et al. 2013), or other kinds of
quantum-like models for the conjunction fallacy that have not been tested in this paper, like
Yukalov and Sornette (2010, 2011). However, our results also provide some conclusions
well beyond quantum-like modeling: they show that the conjunction fallacy cannot be
accounted for by any model or mechanism that relies on order effect, or entails an order
effect, between the two characteristics at play (“feminist”and“bank teller” in Linda’s case).
Quantum-like models are well-known such examples, but it must be clear that any existing
or future alternative explanation that involves a question order effect is ruled out. After the
failure of quantum-like models, this places a hard constraint on alternative explanations of
the conjunction fallacy. We suggest that future works should try to theoretically inquire
whether alternative explanations predict an order effect, and to experimentally test it.
Even if the quantum-like models studied in this paper are not able to account for our
data, a possible research strategy could be not to abandon the quantum-like modeling of
the conjunction fallacy altogether, but instead to try to modify and improve it so that it
finally agrees with the experimental data. In this spirit, one could investigate whether the
use of a more general measurement theory or generalized observables could be adequate.
For instance, the use of Positive Operator Valued Measures (POVMs), from quantum
physics, has been recently applied to quantum-like models of cognition (cf. Khrennikov
and Basieva 2014). However, it seems to face some new challenges like response replicability
(cf. Khrennikov et al. 2014, Basieva and Khrennikov 2015). Another quantum-like line of
research that does not face this problem considers a modification of the Born rule (Aerts
and Sassoli de Bianchi, 2015).
As a last remark, our methodology has been here to test quantum-like models of the
conjunction fallacy with new experimental predictions. We think this methodology could
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be fruitfully extended to quantum-like models that address other fallacies, such as the
disjunction fallacy or the inverse fallacy.
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A Testing the equality of two conditional relative frequen-
cies
The statistical test is to compare two conditional relative frequencies y and x, with the
null hypothesis that they are equal. The test is therefore
y = x, (27)
where both y and x are observed as conditional relative frequencies.
Testing equation 27 is equivalent to test
log
(
y
1− y
)
= log
(
x
1− x
)
,
given that y and x are not equal to zero.
Alternatively, we can formulate the test in terms of the log odds ratio (OR)
log(OR) = log
(
y
1−y
x
1−x
)
= 0.
Consider the first statistical test,
T1 : f(Xy|Yy) = f(Yy|Xy). (28)
We can thus test the following condition:
log
(
f(Xy|Yy)
1− f(Xy|Yy)
)
= log
(
f(Yy|Xy)
1− f(Yy|Xy)
)
,
or
log
(
f(Xy|Yy)
f(Xn|Yy)
)
= log
(
f(Yy|Xy)
f(Yn|Xy)
)
.
By expressing the conditional relative frequencies in terms of joint frequencies, that is,
f(Xy|Yy) = n(Yy, Xy)
n(Yy, ·) , f(Yy|Xy) =
n(Xy, Yy)
n(Xy, ·) , . . .
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with n(Yy, ·) and n(Xy, ·) the y-components of the marginal frequencies of Y and X, we
obtain
log
(
n(Yy, Xy)
n(Yy, ·)
n(Yy, ·)
n(Yy, Xn)
)
= log
(
n(Xy, Yy)
n(Xy, ·)
n(Xy, ·)
n(Xy, Yn)
)
,
or simplifying
log(OR) = log
(
n(Yy, Xy)n(Xy, Yn)
n(Yy, Xn)n(Xy, Yy)
)
= 0, (29)
We can thus test indifferently eq. 28 or 29.
Given condition 29, to perform the statistical test we suppose here that
log(OR)
SElogOR
∼ N(0, 1), (30)
where SElogOR is the standard error of the log odds ratio. It is estimated as the square root
of the sum of the inverse of all the joint frequencies that are considered in the estimation
of the OR:
SEOR =
√
1
n(Yy, Xy)
+
1
n(Xy, Yn)
+
1
n(Yy, Xn)
+
1
n(Xy, Yy)
. (31)
Finally, we also apply the continuity correction to the estimation of OR, because the
normal approximation to the binomial is used, which is effective in particular for small
values of n(Xi, Yj) or n(Yj , Xi):
log
(
(n(Yy, Xy) + 0.5)(n(Xy, Yn) + 0.5)
(n(Yy, Xn) + 0.5)(n(Xy, Yy) + 0.5)
)
= 0. (32)
B French version of the tasks
“Linda”:
– Text: “Linda a 31 ans, elle est ce´libataire, franche, et tre`s brillante. Elle est diploˆme´e
en philosophie. Lorsqu’elle e´tait e´tudiante, elle se sentait tre`s concerne´e par les ques-
tions de discrimination et de justice sociale et avait aussi participe´ a` des manifesta-
tions anti-nucle´aires.”
– QF : “Selon vous, Linda est-elle fe´ministe ?”
– QB : “Selon vous, Linda est-elle employe´e de banque ?”
“Bill”:
– Text: “Bill a 34 ans. Il est intelligent, mais n’a pas d’imagination, il est compulsif,
et ge´ne´ralement plutoˆt e´teint. A` l’e´cole, il e´tait fort en mathe´matiques, mais faible
dans les sciences humaines et sociales.”
– QA : “Selon vous, Bill est-il comptable ?”
– QJ : “Selon vous, Bill joue-t-il du jazz pour ses loisirs ?”
“Mr. F.”:
– Text: “Une enqueˆte de sante´ a e´te´ mene´e en France sur un e´chantillon repre´sentatif
d’hommes adultes de tous aˆges et de toutes professions. Dans cet e´chantillon, on a
choisi au hasard Monsieur F.
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– QH : “Selon vous, Monsieur F. a-t-il de´ja` eu une ou plusieurs attaques cardiaques ?”
– QM : “Selon vous, Monsieur F. a-t-il plus de 55 ans ?”
“K.”:
– Text: “K. est une femme russe.”
– QN : “Selon vous, K. vit-elle a` New York ?”
– QI : “Selon vous, K. est-elle une interpre`te ?”
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